

# THE EU'S POLICY TOWARDS UKRAINE: TOWARDS AN EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OR ACCEPTANCE OF A 'WIDER RUSSIA

Presented by Bogdana Depo  
EXACT Marie Curie Fellow  
PhD Candidate

Workshop

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Risks and Opportunities in Europe's Two Largest Countries

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**exact**



**MARIE CURIE ITN ON  
EU EXTERNAL ACTION**

# Outline

Part I Legal Word: how similar or different is the strategy offered to the Eastern Partnership countries (EaP) and the Western Balkans (WB)?

- Regional level
- Bilateral level

Part II Real World: interests of the EU Member States in integrating Ukraine

- Realist
- Economic
- Normative

# Regional/Multilateral (I): Aim

EaP: ‘create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries’ (EaP Prague Declaration 2009)

WB: ‘reaffirms that the peace, prosperity and stability of South East Europe are a strategic priority for the European Union’

PLUS ‘...overall objective remains the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe’ (Lisbon European Council Conclusions 2000)

# Regional/Multilateral (II): Type of the Document and Political Representation

- EaP: Prague Declaration inaugurating the Eastern Partnership in May 2009 was a 'common endeavour of the Member States of the European Union and their Eastern European Neighbours.'
- Political representation: level of the Heads of States and governments, while ten were absent including Sarkozy, Berlusconi, Zapatero and Brown
- WB: Lisbon European Council unilateral offer of the membership prospective which was giving the Com clear instructions

# Bilateral level (I): SAA/AA structure

SAA with Croatia	AA with Ukraine
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Preamble,</li><li>1. General principles</li><li>2. Political dialogue;</li><li>3. Regional cooperation;</li><li>4. Free movement of goods</li><li>5. <u>Movement of workers, establishment, supply of services, capital</u></li><li>6. Approximation of laws, law enforcement and competition rules</li><li>7. Justice and home affairs</li><li>8. Cooperation policies</li><li>9. Financial cooperation</li><li>10. Institutional, general and final provisions</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Preamble,</li><li>1. General objectives and principles;</li><li>2. Political dialogue;</li><li>3. Justice, Freedom and Security;</li><li>4. Economic and sectoral cooperation;</li><li>5. <u>Energy</u>;</li><li>6. Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area;</li><li>7. General, institutional and final provisions.</li></ul>

# Bilateral level (II): Content

## Similar content, BUT different political interpretation

### Preamble

- ⦿ **UA:** specifies 'European identity of Ukraine' – Art. 49 LT - 3 months of tough negotiations, nothing on 'respect the values...'

'Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.' (Art. 49 LTFEU)

- ⦿ **HR:** 'RECALLING the European Union's readiness to integrate to the fullest possible extent Croatia into the political and economic mainstream of Europe and its status as a potential candidate for EU membership'

# Legal Word: Conclusions

- On regional level – the membership for WB was offered in 2000, not in EaP
- Political level of the EU for WB was the highest, unilateral proposal, and within unanimity; EaP: partnership, low political support from the EU side
- Bilateral level: very similar content of the agreements, different political interpretation
- UA has to adopt 80 per cent of the acquis only with an aim to implement DCFTA provisions

# Part II: REAL WORLD

## Theoretical Triangulation:

- Realism – security interests
- Liberal Intergovernmentalism - economic
- Normative Power Europe - normative

## To Analyse: based on interviews

- France
- Germany
- Sweden
- Poland

# Theoretical Approach (I)

## Realism

! Search of security, maximization of power

'Building up a belt of friendly states that would serve as a buffer zone against an unfriendly and revisionist Russia.'

Russia is always on our mind when taking decisions on Ukraine

- France: before Arab Spring attention and money was taken from Southern Neighbourhood, **now** position is softer on UA
- Germany: UA bridge between EU and Russia (security area), blocked NATO membership, 42% of gas from Russia
- Poland: Russia is a potential aggressor (32% Poles believe that Russia is responsible for Smolensk tragedy)
- Sweden: since end 90<sup>th</sup> – promoter of stability and democracy and sees it as a 'big mission' in the EU

# Theoretical Approach (II)

## Liberal intergovernmentalism

! Opening 'black box', unveils national preferences, goes into trade relations and economic integration interests

- 1st group of UA's trading partners are: France, Germany and Poland (trade flow > 2 bln USD), but Russia is more important trading partner
- 3<sup>rd</sup> group: Sweden (trade flow <1 bln USD)
- DCFTA: high expectations of FR, DE, PL

Beer countries versus wine countries in DCFTA negotiations: industry versus agriculture.

Main sensitive issues for UA-EU: energy and transportation markets, sanitarian and phytosanitary standards, and agricultural commodities

Sweden: 3 banks, aims at supporting SMEs (again more normative approach)

# Theoretical Approach (III)

## Normative Power Europe

! Studies the ideational aspect of the EU, promotion of five norms: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights

EU level: strong normative promoter, in ENP, EaP, bilateral level also.

Timoshenko case:

- ⦿ France and Germany: realist actors in normative cloths. Rule of law in UA is needed to protect foreign business
- ⦿ Poland: promotion of values through integration
- ⦿ Sweden: biggest donor to UA since 2000, Strategy for Development Cooperation w UA 09-13

# Correlation of the Interests

	France	Germany	Poland	Sweden
Realist	Russia: security partner + Southern Dimension	Russia: energy security partner	Russia: security threat	No explicit position
Economic	Less significant; DCFTA will increase	Very significant; DCFTA will increase	Significant, DCFTA will increase	Not important, support SME
Normative	Realist actor in normative cloths	Realist actor in normative cloths	Democratizati on through integration	Pure Normative Approach
Support of membership	No	No	Yes	Yes

# Conclusion:

## **EU's Policy towards Ukraine: Towards an Eastern Enlargement or Acceptance of a Wider Russia?**

- ⦿ Legal Word: current instruments could prepare UA to Eastern Enlargement, but there is no political promise as for WB
- ⦿ Real World: EU level - policy in between, but NOT accepting Wider Russia. Aims at constant economic integration and establishing the 'one EU rule in the house'